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1. Introduction  
Objects in our visual environment can be identified using many different features (e.g., 
shape, luminance, color, texture, relative size, stereo depth, and motion; see Treisman & 
Kanwisher, 1998). Color is one type of information that provides useful cues for object 
recognition. Color for instance increases the visibility of objects and makes it easier for 
us to detect them (e.g., Gouras & Eggers, 1983). It has frequently been suggested that 
fruit and primate trichromacy co-evolved, i.e. one of the evolutionary advantages of color 
may be that it has enabled us to detect ripe fruits colored in orange, red, or yellow against 
a background of green leaves (e.g., Caine & Mundy, 2000). Consistent with this claim it 
has been observed that humans with dichromatic vision have difficulty detecting fruit 
against dappled backgrounds where lightness is varying randomly (Mollon, 1989).                                                                                     
  This example shows that color is one type of information that mediates the 
capture of attention by salient regions in the visual environment (e.g., detecting a red 
apple among green leaves). In this case attention is captured with no involvement of 
memory (i.e. through bottom-up activation). Attention however can also be top-down 
(i.e., involving long-term memory) to enable goal-directed visual search (see Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995; Wolfe, 1998). Spoken language is one of the factors that affect the top-
down guidance of attention. 
 The attentional effects of the integration of linguistic information with 
information from the visual environment have recently sparked considerable interest from 
cognitive psychologists. Psycholinguists are interested in how and when visual context 
affects linguistic processing (e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1995), for instance, to assess claims 
that language processing is modular and informationally encapsulated (e.g., that syntactic 
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processing is autonomous and cannot be influenced by semantic or visual context; Fodor, 
1983). Within the area of visual attention, investigators have become interested in how 
visual search for a pre-specified target (e.g., a red object among green objects) is 
mediated by linguistic representations (e.g., Soto & Humphreys, 2007). Thus, attention 
researchers are interested in the language-vision interface to investigate how search is 
affected by the interaction of higher order representations (e.g., linguistic representations) 
with the bottom-up salience of a visual stimulus. 
 In this chapter I will focus on how color-relations between information accessed 
from spoken words and information accessed  from objects in the visual environment 
mediate the guidance of overt attention (i.e. eye gaze). First I will briefly review relevant 
research about influences of color on object recognition, object classification, word 
recognition, and visual search, and then describe recent experimental results that shed 
light on how stored and perceived color information mediate language-based guidance of 
overt attention in the visual world. 
 
2. Background 
Shape is a much stronger diagnostic feature for object recognition than color (e.g., balls, 
like most man-made objects, tend to vary in their color but have a distinctive shape). 
Influential theories of object recognition (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Marr & Nishihara, 
1978) thus have focused on the role of edge-based information (i.e. shape) rather than 
surface  information (e.g., color). Biederman (1987) for instance proposed that objects are 
spatial arrangements of shape-primitives. Every object is assumed to consist of these 
component parts, so-called geons. During object recognition the arrangements of geons 
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detected is matched against structural models of objects stored in long-term memory. 
Biederman does not argue that color perception is delayed relative to detection of edge-
based information. In fact, changes in the surface characteristics (e.g., color) provide 
crucial information for edge-based recognition of objects. But although surface 
information is fundamental for edge detection, it is assumed to play only a secondary role 
for object recognition (at least when edges can be readily determined). In a series of 
experiments Biederman and Ju (1988) compared participants' task performance using 
color photographs and black and white line drawings. Consistent with Biederman’s 
theoretical account, color did not improve performance in object classification tasks. 
Similarly, Davidoff and Ostergaard (1988) found that adding color to black and white 
line drawings did not improve performance in a categorization task (i.e. deciding whether 
objects were living or non-living).  
 Price and Humphreys (1989) however argued that these findings may be task 
specific, i.e. masking and brief durations used in verification tasks may favor edge-based 
information over (surface) color information. Support for this notion comes from many 
studies which have found that object surface color facilitates performance in naming 
tasks (Biederman, & Ju, 1988; Humphreys, Goodale, Jakobson, & Servos, 1994; 
Ostergaard & Davidoff, 1985). Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985) for instance observed 
that adding color to black and white photographs facilitated naming times. Moreover, 
Price and Humphreys (1989) found that color influenced performance when participants 
had to classify birds or fruits, i.e. members of a category that are similar in shape. Thus 
surface color information appears to aid performance in naming tasks, and in verification 
tasks when edge-based cues are less informative about object identity.  
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 The object recognition studies mentioned so far contrasted the influence of shape 
information with the influence of object surface color information. Object surface color 
(i.e. the perceived yellowness of a displayed banana) however may be distinct from 
stored object color knowledge (i.e. our knowledge that bananas are typically yellow). 
Thus it may not only be the surface color of an object that we process when we look at an 
object; we may also access the stored knowledge we have about the typical color of the 
particular type of object. Naor-Raz and Tarr (2003) explored whether color is an intrinsic 
property of object representation, i.e. whether stored color knowledge is routinely 
associated with an object’s representation. Note that the question is not whether we know 
that bananas are yellow (evidently we do) but whether this knowledge is a component of 
object representation. Naor-Raz and Tarr (2003) obtained a Stroop effect, i.e. faster color 
naming times when participants saw a yellow banana than when they saw a purple 
banana. They interpreted this result as evidence that color is an intrinsic component of 
visual representations of objects. Most relevant for the present subject matter, Joseph and 
Proffitt (1996) directly contrasted the influence of stored object color knowledge with the 
influence of object surface color. They found that stored object color knowledge had a 
greater effect than object surface color in a verification task in which participants had to 
decide whether a briefly presented masked picture matched a subsequently presented 
object name. 
In sum, object verification and classification tasks have tended to find that surface 
color information plays a negligible role during object recognition (at least when edges 
can be readily determined and category members have distinct shapes). In contrast, object 
surface color appears to influence the time participants take to name objects. A possible 
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explanation for these contrasting results is that object verification and classification tasks 
favor edge-based information whereas naming tasks require deeper semantic processing 
of objects. The one study that directly contrasted surface with stored color knowledge of 
objects found that stored color knowledge had a greater influence than surface color 
during a verification task. Thus, the literature on color influences during object 
recognition does not provide a clear picture; influences of color appear to depend on the 
properties of the particular task used. 
Similarly conflicting are the data on the access of perceptual (e.g., color) 
information during word recognition. These types of studies have investigated whether 
perceptual knowledge (i.e. knowledge about the typical visual form of an object, e.g., that 
an aspirin is white) facilitates responses in priming tasks (e.g., that the prime aspirin 
speeds up responses to white). Schreuder, Flores d’Arcais, and Glazenborg (1985) found 
that perceptually-related word pairs facilitated naming times. They proposed that 
perceptual information is rapidly and routinely accessed during word recognition. Pecher, 
Zeelenberg, and Raaijmakers (1998) however failed to replicate these results. Pecher et 
al. only obtained significant perceptual priming when they gave participants practice in 
categorizing primes and targets in a perceptual categorization task prior to the priming 
task. Moss, McCormick, and Tyler (1997) observed significant perceptual priming using 
the lexical decision task. Their perceptual priming effect however occurred significantly 
later than the facilitation found for related functional (e.g., information about what 
objects are used for) knowledge. Kellenbach, Wijers, and Mulder (2000) in contrast 
found no significant perceptual priming using the lexical decision task but did observe a 
robust perceptual priming effect using event-related potentials (ERPs).  
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When language is used in real-life situations to refer to an object in the listener’s 
visual environment (e.g., to a frog; “that frog is really ugly”), the listener usually has had 
some pre-exposure to the relevant part of the visual surroundings. In many situations (and 
in contrast to most priming studies in psycholinguistics, e.g., those which used an 
auditory prime followed by an orthographic target), target lexical representations are 
therefore activated by the visual input before the critical spoken input is processed (i.e. 
the lexical concept frog is already somewhat active if the listener has looked at the frog 
before it is referred to). Thus the psycholinguistic studies on the activation of color 
representations during word recognition (e.g., that on hearing frog the listener may or 
may not activate that frogs are typically green) in absence of ‘visual priming’ (i.e. 
without priming by visual objects) may not directly relate to many real-world language-
vision interactions. Similarly, the data from object verification and classification studies 
are of limited relevance in a situation in which the listener has already recognized the 
objects in the visual surroundings. In short, though interesting and suggestive, past 
research in psycholinguistics and visual perception has to be interpreted with caution with 
regard to how color influences language-based guidance of visual orienting. 
More relevant appears to be some recent research in the visual search paradigm 
(Wolfe, 1998, 2003; Palmer, Verghese, & Pavel, 2000) within the field of visual 
attention. Soto and Humphreys (2007) for instance asked their participants to read aloud 
printed words such as “red square”. Participants were then required to search for a target 
in a visual display. Importantly, these targets were unrelated to the items used during the 
reading task (e.g., unrelated to “red square”). Participants' search for the unrelated targets 
however was slowed when a red square was co-present in the visual display. Thus the 
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prior printed descriptions of the color and shape of objects interfered with the subsequent 
visual search. This suggests that information about red squares was retrieved from long-
term memory (and most likely kept active in working memory) and affected attentional 
guidance during the search task. Olivers (submitted) recently had participants search a 
display for grayscale versions of common traffic signs. On each trial one of the signs was 
in full color. Critically, the sign presented in color was never the target. Olivers 
(submitted) found that these color distractors interfered more with the visual search for 
the target when their color was related to the target (e.g., a distractor sign in red when the 
target was a grayscale stop sign). Thus, stored color knowledge (about the normal color 
of the grayscale stop sign) influenced performance even though color was irrelevant to 
the task. 
 
3. Color-mediated language-based guidance of visual orienting 
In a series of studies we explored systematically how color information affects language-
based guidance of visual orienting. In our studies we used a variant of the visual world 
paradigm (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In our version of the paradigm we 
present four spatially-distinct pictures of common objects (e.g., a frog, a mitten, a pipe, 
and a suitcase) on a computer screen (see Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Huettig & 
McQueen, 2007). These visual displays are divided in four virtual quadrants (upper right, 
lower right, lower left, and upper left) with one picture presented in each quadrant. 
Objects are randomly assigned to these quadrants. The spoken sentences typically refer 
(or a related) to one of the objects in the display. We are particularly interested in what 
happens during or immediately after the presentation of a critical word (e.g., “frog”) in 
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the sentence. To avoid anticipatory eye movements based on the context of the sentence 
(see Altmann & Kamide, 1999) each critical word is placed in a neutral sentence context 
(e.g., “The boy turned around carefully, and then he saw the frog and looked happy”). 
Participants typically are given a one second preview of the display before the spoken 
sentences starts to unfold. Moreover since critical words (e.g., “frog”) are not the first 
word in the sentence participants have a few seconds to familiarize themselves with the 
objects prior to its onset. We use arrays of objects (rather than more realistic visual 
scenes) to minimize that scene gist or world knowledge about particular types of scenes 
affect listeners’ understanding of the spoken sentences. When arrays of objects are used 
the impact of such knowledge is minimized; therefore arrays are well suited for studying 
the influence of lexical knowledge associated with particular words and objects. 
 Participants are not asked to perform an explicit task. They are told that they 
should listen to the sentences carefully, that they can look at whatever they want to, but 
that they should not take their eyes off the screen during the experiment (see Huettig & 
McQueen, 2007, for further discussion of the listening-only task). Participants’ eye 
movements are measured throughout the experiment. 
 In our first color study (Huettig & Altmann, 2004) study we presented 
participants with two experimental conditions. In the target condition the objects in the 
display (four line drawings) included the target object (e.g.,  a line drawing of a frog) and 
three unrelated distractors. The target was colored according to its typical color (e.g., 
green in the case of the frog); the distractors were in different colors (e.g., a blue mitten, a 
red suitcase, and  a brown pipe). In the competitor condition the objects were identical 
except that the target object (e.g., the frog) was replaced by a color competitor, i.e. an 
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object (e.g., a lettuce) that is typically associated with the same color as the target object. 
The spoken sentences (“… frog …”) were identical in both conditions, therefore in the 
target condition the object mentioned in the sentence (e.g., “frog”) was present in the 
display but in the competitor condition there was only a color relation between the critical 
spoken word (e.g., “frog”) and one of the object in the display (e.g., lettuce). 
Unsurprisingly, we found that on hearing “frog” participants shifted their eye gaze 
towards the frog. More importantly, however we also observed that in the competitor 
condition participants directed their eye gaze towards the competitor object (that is on 
hearing “frog” they looked at the lettuce; or on hearing “lips” they looked at a strawberry; 
both lips and strawberries have a similar typical color). This study therefore suggested 
that language-mediated visual attention (i.e. eye gaze) is directed immediately towards 
objects that match on color even when they mismatch on most other dimensions (i.e. lips 
and strawberries have little in common other than their similar typical colors).  
 The color competitor effects in the Huettig and Altmann (2004) study were 
contingent upon access of stored color knowledge on hearing the spoken words (e.g., 
“frog”), otherwise we could not have observed any language-mediated color effects. 
However, as the critical objects we used were all associated with a prototypical color and 
also presented in their (surface) color (e.g., a green lettuce), it is unclear whether that 
color competition effect was contingent upon the stored knowledge about the typical 
color of the displayed object (i.e. the fact that we know lettuces are green) or whether the 
effect was contingent purely upon the perceived surface color of the visual object (i.e. our 
perception of the color green in the display) in absence of any stored object color 
knowledge. In our next study (Huettig & Altmann, in press) we examined whether color-
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mediated language-based guidance of visual orienting is driven primarily by the stored 
color knowledge associated with visual objects or whether it is primarily driven by the 
perceived surface colors of the objects in the display. Color is an object property that 
allows such an investigation since conceptual attributes (i.e. the stored color knowledge 
about visual objects) and perceptual attributes (the perceived but non-diagnostic color of 
an object) can be dissociated.1  
 
3.1. Black and white objects 
In Experiment 1 (Huettig and Altmann, in press) we presented black and white line 
drawings to participants. There were no other colors present in the visual displays. Shifts 
in eye gaze towards black and white color competitors (e.g., a black and white frog; frogs 
are typically green) would be due to stored object color knowledge since with black and 
white line drawings no surface color is depicted. There were three experimental 
conditions that differed with respect to the critical word that was presented in the spoken 
sentences. The same visual stimuli were used in all three conditions (a target picture, e.g., 
a frog, and three unrelated distractor objects). In the target condition the sentence 
contained the name of the target object (e.g., “The man thought about it for a while and 
then he looked at the frog and decided to release it back into the wild”). In the competitor 
condition the sentence was identical up to the critical word (e.g., “spinach”; “The man 
thought about it for a while and then he looked at the spinach and decided to try out the 
recipe”); the critical word, i.e. spinach, was not depicted but functioned as a color 
                                                 
1
 The question whether shape competition effects (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; Huettig & Altmann, 2004, 
2007) are contingent upon the perceived shape of the objects in the visual environment or our stored 
knowledge about the shape of a particular object is more difficult to address experimentally since shape is 
not as arbitrary as color to the function of most objects. It may however be possible to explore this issue by 
selecting visual objects that can have a typical and an atypical form (e.g., a closed vs. an open umbrella). 
 12 
competitor to the depicted frog (both frogs and spinach are typically green). We also 
included a control condition in which critical words (e.g., “radish”; “The man thought 
about it for a while and then he looked at the radish and decided to try out the recipe”) 
and depicted objects (e.g., frog) were completely unrelated (there was neither a visual 
referent for radish nor a color match between radish and frog; radishes are typically red). 
We included the control condition because when generating the materials it became 
apparent that most objects with a typical color are fruits, vegetables, and animals. The 
control condition allowed us to asses whether any obtained color competitor effect could 
be confounded with some other semantic/conceptual similarity between animals, fruit, 
and vegetables (e.g., radish is neither a color match nor a semantic/conceptual match for 
frog but belongs to the same category as spinach, i.e. both are vegetables). 
 As in previous research we found that when participants heard the target word 
(e.g., “frog”) they immediately shifted their eye gaze towards the target object (the frog). 
In the competitor condition when they heard “frog” there was a tendency to look at the 
(black and white) lettuce but this tendency was not statistically reliable. In the control 
condition there was no hint of a shift in eye gaze towards the control object (e.g., the 
radish) on hearing “frog”. To recap, in the competitor condition, the concepts accessed by 
the spoken words were associated with a typical color. One of the objects in the display 
was also associated with the same color but all of the displayed objects were presented as 
black and white line drawings. Any shift towards this competitor object therefore would 
have been due to stored object color knowledge and not object surface color. However, 
we did not observe a statistically reliable shift in eye gaze towards competitors. 
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 Why was there no color competition effect with black and white stimuli? One 
possibility is that participants accessed  stored object color knowledge from the black and 
white objects but did not use this information to direct eye gaze. However, this 
explanation of the results seems unlikely. Our past research (Huettig & Altmann, 2004, 
2005; Huettig et al., 2006; Huettig & McQueen, 2007) has shown that people shift their 
eye gaze towards the object in the display that matches best the (conceptual and 
perceptual) specification of the spoken word even if it mismatches on most other 
dimensions. The color competitors (e.g., the black and white frog) were the only objects 
in the display with any match (a match in stored color knowledge) between spoken word 
and the visual display. Such a situation maximizes the likelihood of obtaining an effect 
(though it does not completely rule out that stored object color knowledge was accessed 
because eye gaze is a measure of overt attention and not a direct measure of activation of 
underlying mental representations). 
 There is however a second possibility. The fact that there was no color (other than 
black and white) present in the experiment may have induced attentional biases in 
participants that resulted in the null effect of color relations. There is no visual world 
research that has explored such potential situational task demands. In the visual search 
paradigm (Wolfe, 1998, 2003; Palmer, Verghese, & Pavel, 2000) in the field of visual 
attention however such biases have been explored. Folk and colleagues (Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992, 1993) have provided evidence that a particular visual 
feature may be more or less likely to draw attention depending on the attentional control 
setting adopted by the participant. Similarly, Műller and colleagues (e.g., Found & 
Műller, 1996; Műller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995) have proposed that attentional selection is 
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based on the dimensional properties of objects in the visual field, i.e. top-down 
information of target defining features is assumed to influence feature-processing stages. 
There are many differences between visual world and visual search studies (see Huettig, 
Olivers, & Hartsuiker, submitted, for review), it is however at least conceivable that 
black and white stimuli reduced attention to color because it was of little task-relevance. 
In Experiment 2 (Huettig & Altmann, in press) we explored therefore whether stored 
object color knowledge can ever be used to direct language-mediated eye movements. 
 
3.2. Atypical color 
To address this issue, we used the same materials as in the competitor condition of 
Experiment 1 but presented color and black and white photographs rather than line 
drawings. There were two conditions, a color condition and a black and white condition. 
In the color condition, the target objects (e.g., frog) were presented in an appropriate but 
atypical color (e.g., a yellow frog). Frogs can be all sorts of color (e.g., yellow) but in the 
Netherlands (our participant population) they are typically green. By using atypically 
colored objects we were able to use the same objects as in Experiment 1 (e.g., the same 
frog) but could avoid presenting the (prototypical) surface color  to participants  (i.e. 
green). We hypothesized that if people in principle can use stored object color knowledge 
to direct eye gaze, but in the (black and white) Experiment 1 adopted an attentional 
setting in which color was not relevant, then with the (atypical) color manipulation of 
Experiment 2 it should be possible to observe a stored object color effect. On hearing 
“spinach” (in the sentence “The man thought about it for a while and then he looked at 
the spinach and decided to try out the recipe”) participants should shift overt attention to 
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the (yellow) frog because they have stored color knowledge that frogs in the Netherlands 
are typically green. 
 In the black and white condition everything was identical to the color condition 
except that the photographs were not in color but in black and white. This condition 
served as an additional control. Black and white photographs contain more visual 
information than the simple line drawings (e.g., light and dark contrasts) used in 
Experiment 1. The use of black and white photographs thus served as another test of 
whether stored object color knowledge is ever used  with black and white stimuli. We 
chose a between-participants design, one set of participants was assigned to the color 
condition, another set of participants to the black and white condition. This way the 
experimental design did not create any artificial focus on the presence or absence of 
color, i.e. color was present on all trials for the participants who were assigned to the 
color condition. 
 We found that participants in the color condition shifted their eye gaze more to 
the atypical color competitors than unrelated distractors. This effect however was 
marginal and occurred more than one second after the onset of the critical spoken word. 
This suggests that stored object color knowledge can mediate the language-based 
guidance of visual orienting but this influence appears to be very small. Participants who 
were assigned to the  condition with the black and white photographs did not shift their 
eye gaze towards the competitors. This replicated the results of Experiment 1 that with 
black and white stimuli stored object color knowledge is not used to direct eye gaze. 
 
3.3. Surface color  
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In Experiment 3 (Huettig & Altmann, in press) we presented pure surface color 
competitors (e.g., a green blouse) to participants. Blouses, for instance, are not typically 
green and thus shifts in overt attention to a green blouse on hearing “pea” (peas are 
typically green) could only be due to the perceived surface color in the display. We 
observed that participants started to look at the surface color competitors (e.g., the green 
blouse) as soon as acoustic information from the critical spoken word (e.g., “pea”) 
became available, indicating that hearing “pea” activated prototypical color information 
which overlapped with the perceived surface color of the visually concurrent blouse. 
Thus it is not only stored knowledge but also the perceived surface attributes of visual 
objects which mediate language-based guidance of visual orienting. Notably, the surface 
color effect was also of much greater magnitude than the stored color knowledge effect of 
Experiment 2. This suggests therefore that the surface attributes of visual objects are a 
more important determinant of language-mediated eye movements than the stored 
knowledge about typical object color. 
 
3.4. The role of color labels: Two -year-olds color-mediated shifts in eye gaze 
The only reason why participants shifted their eye gaze to surface color competitors  is 
that they accessed the colour knowledge (e.g., the greenness of a frog) from the spoken 
word because the conceptual make-up of the critical visual stimuli in Experiment 3 
(Huettig & Altmann, in press) did not contain stored colour knowledge (e.g., the green 
blouse). Activation of stored color knowledge from spoken words may be direct or 
indirect. Hearing the name of a concept associated with a typical color (e.g., “frog”) may 
lead to direct activation of stored color knowledge which in turn leads to shifts in eye 
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gaze to green things in the environment. It is however possible that activation is indirect, 
i.e. mediated by the activation of stored color labels (e.g., the label “green” accessed on 
hearing the spoken words). When people hear the spoken word “frog”, they may 
automatically access the word green, which may then cause them to shift their eye gaze 
to anything that is green in the display. This notion is supported by responses in free 
word association tasks. When participants are asked to write down the first word they 
think of when reading the word frog, they typically give the response green (e.g., Nelson, 
McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998)2.   
 We (Johnson and Huettig, in preparation) have recently investigated this issue 
with young children who have yet to learn any color terms. We pre-tested two-year-olds 
on their understanding of color terms (e.g., "point to the red thing"). Two-year-olds were 
asked to look at one of two smiley faces that were identical in all ways besides color, e.g., 
the children heard ‘look at the red one’ while viewing a red smiley face and a yellow 
smiley face.  Note that this test of color label knowledge was unlike most past studies of 
color label knowledge in young children in that it did not require children to actually 
verbally produce color labels or produce a motor response such as pointing to the correct 
object. Rather, all our participants had to do was look towards the correctly colored 
                                                 
2
 Note however that we do not argue that language-mediated eye movements reflect primarily simple 
associative relationships. Indeed, Huettig and Altmann (2005) found that participants directed overt 
attention towards a depicted object (such as a trumpet) when a semantically related but not associatively 
related target word (e.g., "piano") was heard (see also Yee & Sedivy, 2006). Importantly, the probability of 
fixating the semantic competitor correlated significantly with the semantic similarity between spoken word 
(e.g., "piano") and competitor object (e.g., trumpet) as derived from semantic feature norms (Cree & 
McRae, 2003). These data suggested that the increased attention directed to semantically related items 
(relative to distractor objects) is a function of the degree of semantic overlap. Huettig et al. (2006; see also 
Yee, Overton, & Thompson-Schill, 2009) provided further evidence for this conclusion. They found that 
several corpus-based measures of word semantics (Latent Semantic Analysis, Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
Contextual Similarity, McDonald, 2000) each correlated well with fixation behavior. These data provide 
strong evidence that language-mediated eye movements are driven by semantic similarity between spoken 
word and visual object rather than all-or-none categorical knowledge. 
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object. Thus, due to the low task demands, this testing procedure provided a very 
sensitive measure of children’s color label knowledge. 
We observed that two-year-olds who did not understand color labels showed 
similar color-mediated eye movements to adults (see also the research within the 
preferential looking paradigm often used in developmental studies, e.g., Arias-Trejo & 
Plunkett, 2010; Golinkoff et al., 1987; and Johnson & Huettig, in press, for color-
mediated eye movements in three-year-olds). Two-year-olds who were unable to verbally 
encode the specific relationship between a spoken referent and a seen object nonetheless 
recognized the perceptual-conceptual commonality between the two to direct eye gaze 
during online listening. Our results thus suggest that color-mediated language-based 
guidance of visual orienting is direct, i.e. not mediated by color labels. When two-year-
olds who did not understand the color term red were asked to find a strawberry, they were 
more likely to look at the red plane than the yellow plane even though they could not 
verbally encode the color property shared by the named and seen objects. These results 
suggest that the color effect, at least in young children, is not mediated by activation of 
color labels.  
 
3.5.  Surface color vs. conceptual category 
When confronted with objects in their visual surroundings and concurrent spoken 
language, people actively combine information from the utterance and the visual 
environment to best interpret the situation at hand (see Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Huettig 
& McQueen, 2007; Huettig, Rommers, & Meyer, under revision; Knoeferle & Crocker, 
2006). A situation in which people are exposed to only one competitor (e.g., a surface 
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colour competitor) in the visual surroundings (among unrelated objects) is therefore very 
different from a situation in which people are exposed to two types of competitors (e.g., a 
surface colour competitor and a conceptual competitor). In the first case only one type of 
competitor competes for overt attention but in the second case people's attention may be 
pulled in different directions. If only one type of competitor is present, this information 
may be used immediately to direct overt attention because no other information is 
available for the mapping process. But when two types of competitors are co-present one 
type of information may be weighed more strongly than the other. 
 In Huettig and Altmann (in press) we also contrasted the time-course of language-
mediated eye movements contingent upon surface color information with language-
mediated eye movements contingent upon semantic/conceptual information. We 
presented surface color competitors (e.g., green blouse) and semantic/conceptual 
competitors (e.g., mushroom) in the same visual display (among two unrelated 
distractors). The intention was to investigate whether one type of information is 
prioritized when the system is faced with different types of competitors at the same  time. 
Moss and colleagues (e.g., Moss et al., 1997) for instance have shown that 
functional/semantic knowledge is a particular salient aspect of lexical knowledge. It is 
conceivable that the strength of activation of a particular feature determines the 
probability of attending towards whatever shares those features in the visual environment. 
 We observed that, on hearing words associated with a typical color such as “pea”, 
participants shifted their eye gaze towards the semantic/conceptual competitors (e.g., 
mushroom) about 400 ms earlier than they shifted their eye gaze towards the surface 
color competitors (e.g., the green blouse). In a condition in which the surface color 
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competitor was the only competitor in the display, however, participants directed their 
eye gaze immediately towards the surface competitors on hearing the critical spoken 
word. These findings suggest that semantic/conceptual knowledge is a particular salient 
aspect of knowledge even for natural objects that are high in color diagnosticity. When 
semantic/conceptual information is co-present with a competing surface color match, it is 
semantic/conceptual information that is prioritized during language-based guidance of 
visual orienting.  
 
4. Open questions and future directions 
Color is one of many different factors (e.g., shape, size, motion, etc.) that mediates 
language-based guidance of visual orienting. The research reviewed above has shown 
that both object surface color and stored object color knowledge influence language-
driven eye movements around the visual world. It appears however that object surface 
color is a far more important determinant of language-based guidance of visual orienting 
than stored object color knowledge. One may ask why this is the case. 
 A reason may be that access of surface color is faster and requires less cognitive 
resources than access of stored object color knowledge. According to feature integration 
theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) attention is needed for the binding of object features. 
There appears to be a pre-attentive state in which features such as color are bound to 
locations (and even objects) but without being bound together (Wolfe & Bennett, 1997). 
Thus surface color of an object can be processed at a pre-attentive stage but retrieval of 
stored object color knowledge requires the binding of features and thus attentional 
processing. It may be that this distinction between pre-attentive processing and 
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attentional focus is the cause of the primacy of object surface color in the present 
research. Of course in our experiments the visual objects (e.g., the frog) usually are 
inspected prior to the acoustic unfolding of the critical words (e.g., prior to hearing 
“spinach”), and thus were previously in the focus of attention. However, Wolfe (1999) 
has presented evidence that even previously attended objects may revert to a state similar 
to pre-attentive processing once attention is withdrawn (see also the literature on change 
blindness, e.g., Simons, 1996). 
 This raises the question about the role of working memory during the present 
language-vision interactions. In the field of visual attention it has been suggested  that 
long-term-memory representations of visual objects are bound to locations (so-called 
object files, Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992). We (Huettig, Olivers, & Hartsuiker, 
under revision) have recently argued that language-based guidance of visual orienting is 
mediated by working memory. There is a wealth of evidence that working memory is 
limited to about four objects that can be tracked, cued, prioritized, and actively 
remembered (Atkinson, Campbell, & Francis, 1976; Burkell & Pylyshyn, 1997; Cowan, 
2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; 
Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994; Sperling, 1960; Yantis & Johnson, 
1990). The prediction from this research is that increasing the number of objects in the 
visual display should eliminate the stored object color effect; the object surface color 
effect however may be little affected by processing load and working memory capacity 
limits if we accept the argument that only pre-attentive processing of the display is 
necessary for it to occur. Clearly more empirical research is needed to evaluate this 
prediction. 
 22 
 One related issue to be resolved concerns the issue of attentional sets (or 
dimensional weighting). We have suggested that the absence of a stored colour 
knowledge effect with black and white line drawings and photographs may be due to an 
attentional setting that made retrieval (and attentional use) of colour information less 
likely. How attentional sets are established in visual world tasks such as the one 
employed by us is yet unknown. But we have already begun to address this issue. Huettig 
and McQueen  (2007) showed that when pictures in the visual display were replaced with 
printed words (i.e. the names of the objects) attentional shifts were made only to the 
phonological competitors (but not semantic or shape competitors) irrespective of preview 
time. Huettig and McQueen suggested that this was because phonological information is 
the most relevant for a search among printed words. In other words, the search task with 
printed-word displays led participants to focus attention on the possibility of 
phonological matches in the situation where the display consists of orthographic 
representations of the sound forms of words. In a more recent study (Huettig & 
McQueen, submitted), we presented displays which consisted of semantic and visual-
feature competitors of critical spoken words, and two unrelated distractors (Experiment 
1). There were significant shifts in eye gaze towards the semantic but not the visual 
competitors. Thus participants can use semantic knowledge to direct attention on printed-
word displays when phonological matches are impossible. In Experiment 2 semantic 
competitors were replaced with a further set of unrelated distractors but here was still no 
hint of preferential fixations towards the visual-feature competitors. In Experiment 3, 
semantically more loaded sentences were presented to encourage deeper semantic 
processing and visual imagery but again no shifts in eye gaze to visual competitors 
 23 
occurred. It appears therefore that attentional sets depend on the nature of the information 
in the visual environment (printed words or visual objects) and the situation in which 
participants find themselves (see also the research on context-dependent access of 
semantic/conceptual features, e.g., Barsalou, 1982; Glucksberg & Estes, 2000; Tabossi, 
1988). 
 In another recent study (Huettig & Altmann, in preparation) we further 
investigated attentional sets by increasing the salience and thus relevance of colour in the 
experimental setting. We used a within-participants counter-balanced design and 
alternated colour and black and white trials randomly throughout the experiment. 
Therefore on one trial our participants heard a word such as 'spinach' and saw a frog 
(coloured in green) in the visual display. On the next trial however they saw a banana (in 
black and white) on hearing 'canary' (bananas and canaries are typically yellow), and so 
on. The presence (or absence) of colour was thus a salient characteristic. If the absence of 
a colour effect with black and white stimuli (Huettig & Altmann, 2004, in press) was 
simply due to a general experimental context which reduced (or even eliminated) an 
attentional focus to colour features then such a manipulation should greatly increase the 
likelihood of attentional shifts to the colour competitors in the black and white trials. 
However, again there was no hint of a color effect in the black and white trials (in 
contrast to the color trials). This indicates that attentional settings can be established on a 
trial-by-trial basis. On black and white trials, color is not relevant and thus it is not used; 
on color trials it is relevant and thus participants use this information to guide language-




Language-mediated eye movements are not always conscious or intentional (at least not 
in the sense that participants always consciously plan in advance which objects they will 
fixate). In such situations eye gaze is directed to objects that share a color relation with 
concurrently processed linguistic representations even if these objects mismatch on most 
other dimensions. Interestingly, such language-based guidance of visual orienting is not 
mediated by color when black and white stimuli are presented. When color is present, 
object surface color (rather than stored object color knowledge) is the primary 
determinant of language-based attentional guidance. These color effects, at least in young 
children, are not mediated by activation of color labels. Two-year-olds were more likely 
to look at a red plane than a yellow plane on hearing “strawberry” even though they could 
not verbally encode the color property (i.e. the property red) shared by the named and 
seen objects. Though we have made much progress in our understanding of how color 
mediates language-vision interactions, it is clear that there are still many unknowns about 
how color influences the integration of linguistic and visual representations. Some of the 
most interesting questions to be addressed concern the role of pre-attentive processing, 
the effect of processing load and working memory capacity limits, the influence of task 
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